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American Landpower and
the Middle East of 2030
Michael R. Eastman
The Proverbial Debate

A

s our current wars in Iraq and Afghanistan wind down, political deliberations in this country return to a familiar pattern. Intent on “not re-fighting
the last war,” a debate about future military strategy dominates the discussion. As in the past, the debate is sharpened by a budget ax suspended over
the Department of Defense. The services anticipate funding cuts so deep as
to allow for only one strategic approach to survival. And, as in the past, many
approach the problem as bureaucrats defending turf, rather than as strategists
objectively creating a military that will best serve the nation.
These discussions risk overshadowing some of the most fundamental
considerations necessary for developing a sound strategy—which threats will
our nation most likely face and what will the military we retain be capable of
doing. Even in a fiscal environment that foreshadows major reductions, elements of sound strategic planning remain invaluable. As military professionals,
we need to examine threats to our national interests, current and future, and
offer our best advice as to how these challenges should be addressed. If nothing
else, the civilian leadership needs to be advised of those things that can and
cannot be accomplished (without great cost or unacceptable risk) as a result of
their decisions.
This article frames a response to one future role of American land
forces by examining the Middle East over the next twenty years. It begins by
highlighting our enduring national interests in the region. It then considers
potential threats to these interests, current and future, and attempts to assess
their likelihood. Finally, those scenarios that require American ground forces
are identified, along with the implications of these decisions. The intent is to
provide a strategic perspective in a debate too often clouded by budgetary concerns and unnecessarily framed as an interservice, zero-sum game.

The Problem with Predictions
Any effort to forecast future conflicts is inherently a questionable
endeavor.1 If the past is any indication, the strategist is far more often wrong
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than right on the specifics. The work is doubly in jeopardy when the attempt
is tied to a particular service and vulnerable to concerns of parochialism and
bureaucratic interests. This article acknowledges these challenges, examining
as it does the role of landpower in the Middle East for the next two decades
from an Army perspective. This is not an attempt at perfect prediction nor are
ground forces offered as the military panacea for all future contests in this
region. There are, however, vital national interests at stake in the Middle East
for the foreseeable future, and a wide range of threats to these interests.
While informed observers may argue about the probability of one
threat or another actually occurring, there is a general consensus regarding
America’s interests and the potential threats. There is little dispute that demand
for petroleum will increase with the industrial expansion of China and India,
or that demographic pressures and an overwhelmingly youthful population
will increase political pressures on Middle Eastern regimes. The latent questions, then, are which of these threats requires a capability uniquely resident in
American ground forces, and what does that mean for the Army in the current
fiscal environment?
While it may be impossible to predict with certainty the actions of
a potential adversary, the experience of the last several conflicts has shown
American ground forces, and the Army in particular, provide the nation with a
set of capabilities that simply cannot be achieved solely from the other domains.
Whether as a demonstration of American political intent through boots on the
ground, a deterrent against the largely land-based forces of this region, a training partnership with current and future allies, or a force seasoned by a decade
of war, American ground forces fill a vital and complementary role in the suite
of options available to this nation in times of adversity.
While there is bound to be disagreement about the powers of prediction, perfect foresight is not the goal. Instead, we should seek to identify a
range of likely challenges the nation may face as a basis for weighing decisions
related to capabilities inherent in the future force. Whether or not these specific
challenges come to fruition is at least partly impacted by an adversary’s calculations regarding America’s ability to prevent or counter them.

The United States’ Vital Interests in the Middle East
The 2010 National Security Strategy identifies four enduring national
interests:
•• The security of the United States, its citizens, and US allies and partners.
•• A strong, innovative, and growing US economy in an open international
economic system that promotes opportunity and prosperity.
•• Respect for universal values at home and around the world.
•• An international order advanced by US leadership that promotes peace, security, and opportunity through stronger cooperation to meet global challenges.2
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When the overarching goals of national security, prosperity, values, and international order are considered in the context of the Middle East, three vital
interests emerge that will remain relevant decades into the future.
Any discussion of US strategic interests in the Middle East begins
with ensuring global access to oil. In the 2011 World Energy Outlook, the
International Energy Agency projects the Organization of the Petroleum
Exporting Countries (OPEC) will supply nearly half of all global demand by
2030, up from 42 percent today.3 Much of the growth in demand will come
from the developing economies of China and India.4 Despite domestic actions
taken over the next few decades to reduce American reliance on foreign oil,
the majority of our trading partners will remain dependent on a commodity
concentrated in the Middle East.5
These projections make stability and security in the region a precondition for the successful functioning of international markets. Even the perception
of a disruption to the flow of oil will have global consequences, damaging international economies and directly impacting the prosperity of America and its
allies. As such, it remains in our national interest to ensure stability across this
region, not only because the United States requires OPEC oil, but also because
the global free market system depends on access to this crucial commodity.
A second vital national interest in the Middle East is the disruption,
dismantling, and defeat of those extremist networks that have the intent and
capability to threaten the United States or its allies. Many terrorist organizations trace their origins to this region, where they have taken full advantage of
popular dissatisfaction, dysfunctional governments, and ungoverned territories
to create bases of operation, recruitment, and training. The radical Islamist
component of these groups is intrinsic to their appeal, making their continued
presence in the Middle East a reasonable assumption for future years.
A third related interest is denying terrorist organizations and their
proxies access to weapons of mass destruction. Possession of nuclear, biological, chemical, or radiological weapons would enable these groups to perpetuate
violence on a spectacular scale. Controlling the spread of these weapons, along
with the knowledge required to produce them, remains a vital national interest.
For this reason, continued efforts to limit the proliferation of these weapons to
regimes opposed to the United States, such as Iran, remain a strategic objective
There are unquestionably additional interests for the United States in
the Middle East. For example, the spread of democratic values and respect for
basic human rights, the continued participation of Turkey as a North Atlantic
Treaty Organization (NATO) partner, and defense of Israel as a democratic ally
in the region. While important, these impact the development and execution of
military strategy only in the sense that they are components of vital interests
already discussed.
This fact remains true for two fundamental reasons. First, many of the
specific regional interests of the United States have a temporal component that
makes their utility in the development of future strategy problematic. Second,
while the defense of universal human rights and the promotion of democracy
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have long been at the heart of America’s national interests, the military is less
effective in achieving these interests than are a number of the other components
of national power. Although partnership with regional militaries or the potential
isolation of adversaries certainly contribute to our moral and ideological objectives, they primarily do so through preventive actions aimed at ensuring stability.

The Middle East of 2030 and Beyond
It is extremely difficult to forecast the future trajectory of events in this
region. Lacking perfect foresight, the strategist can only survey what is known
of events and actors and make probabilistic assessments of how things will
evolve. To be certain, short of assuming an outbreak of stability in the Middle
East (which seems wildly irresponsible as a matter of policy regardless of how
desirable this may be), one needs to examine current trends and potential threats
impacting vital national interests.
First among these is the continued importance of petroleum to the
global market. More than half of the world’s oil supply will reside in this
region, with Iraq’s production increasing to meet and perhaps even exceed
all other nations except Saudi Arabia. At the same time, countries not currently endowed with an abundance of petroleum are unlikely to discover it.
Given the ever-increasing importance of oil over the next several decades,
this shortage of such a critical resource has numerous consequences.
Middle Eastern countries whose economies rely almost exclusively
on energy exports for revenue will have little incentive to diversify. Patronage
and the redistribution of oil revenues, whether in the form of social welfare
or government patronage, will remain the dominant practice.6 Development
of a viable middle class will be retarded, and the wealth gap between social
strata will persist fostering popular dissatisfaction. A secondary result of the
reliance on oil exports will be the growing inability of OPEC members to
manipulate production for political gain. Relying on petroleum revenues to
secure governmental power while having to financially placate a disenfranchised population, political leaders will be unable to accept large fluctuations
in production. Consequently, these pressures make threats to close the Straits
of Hormuz ring hollow, as such an option would be the equivalent of political
suicide for regional powers. Any short-term damage to the global market
would be more than offset by domestic unrest in the initiating countries,
and in all probability meet with incredible resistance from OPEC members
whose own survival relies on the flow of this commodity.
The rise in prices that always accompanies growing demand will also
have a dramatic impact on the poorer countries in the region. As their neighbors become wealthier, the lack of comparable markets, a commercial middle
class, and modern transportation infrastructure will leave many nations even
further behind. The resulting popular dissatisfaction will be exacerbated by
other regional trends that threaten to destabilize the entire region.
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Demographic projections indicate that by 2030 more than half the population of the Middle East will be under the age of 34, a figure exceeding that of
the developed world (see Figure 1).7

Figure 1. 2030 Aggregate Population Age Distribution (Middle East and the Developed
World). Source: United States Census Bureau International Population Database, 2012.

This “youth bulge” promises to challenge even the most efficient of governments as demands for education, social services, and upward mobility are met
with limited opportunities, silence, and repression.8 Governments that rely
heavily on oil revenue redistribution will be hard pressed to meet the needs of
an increasingly interconnected society that is only too aware of standards of
living in other parts of the world. Those that favor a more radical interpretation
of Islam are likely to focus their dissatisfaction on external forces, blaming
Western society as the source of all their problems. With few prospects for
positive improvement in their social status, we are almost certain to witness the
continued emigration of intellectual capital. Those unable to flee will provide
a reservoir of potential recruits attracted to the message of radical Islam and
eager to vent their frustration.
The evolution of popular uprisings throughout the region represents a
third general trend impacting the Middle East for the next several decades. As
recent events have demonstrated, predictions of a regional shift toward forms of
democratic institutions are premature at best. There is undoubtedly some level
of commonality with recent protest movements against ineffective or repressive
government. The manner in which affected regimes have responded, however,
along with internal divisions within protest groups, make a result favoring
Western democracies unlikely.
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The instability associated with nations attempting to transition between
various forms of government is one of the most pressing factors in identifying future threats. Multiple studies have demonstrated that transitioning to a
democratic form of government, even if loosely defined as achieving stable
representative government, is a process often requiring 20 to 30 years. More
troubling, states undergoing either a transition to democracy or backsliding
toward greater autocracy are far more likely to go to war than those with a
stable government.9
Which Middle Eastern countries ultimately adopt a representative form
of government is, therefore, less important than the instability that accompanies
these transitions. With numerous nations in the early stages of transition, the likelihood of conflict has to be considered quite high in the coming decades. While
there is evidence some of these states may eventually succeed in their quest
for representative government, it does not necessarily bode well for regional
stability in the interim. There is also a high probability that even a representative government in a nation such as Egypt or Syria will retain an anti-Western
orientation in keeping with the prevailing popular views of its citizens.10
A nuclear Iran represents the fourth major variable impacting American
national interests in the region. Despite a continuing effort to undermine Iran’s
nuclear program, it is quite probable they will develop a number of low-yield
weapons within the next decade. This reality poses at least two distinct challenges for America and other Western democracies.11 Emboldened by the
possession of a nuclear weapon, Iran will feel secure from invasion. The regime
will be increasingly prone to exert pressures on neighboring states as it attempts
to expand authority over the Shia populace in the region. While it is unlikely
that Iran will conduct any cross-border invasions or engage in overt interstate
war, it will still experience many of the same pressures of demographics and
economic unrest as the remainder of the region. Unable to meet the demands
of a restive populace, the Iranian regime will likely focus attention outward to
distract citizens from problems at home. Operating under the belief that nuclear
weapons prohibitively raise the stakes for any intervention, the Iranians will
remain a persistent force for instability across the region.
The possibility that Iran might be willing to share nuclear technology
with terrorist groups should also enter into any strategic calculations. Although
the risks of state-sponsored nuclear terrorism are not lost on the Iranian regime,
there are still significant challenges associated with preventing the transfer of
weapons and nuclear technology to nonstate actors.12 Barring massive governmental reform, divisions between the Iranian military and political leadership,
along with the opposition to the United States and the West in general, make
unsanctioned weapons transfer an ever-present threat.
Finally, given the possibility of a nuclear-armed Iran on their doorstep, a number of the more advanced Gulf States should be expected to initiate
weapons programs of their own. The dynamics of such arms races are only
too well known, as is their tendency to create instability and miscalculation.
The diversion of government funding and focus on weapons programs will
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distract regimes from providing for basic societal needs, further exacerbating
discontent across the region.
Consideration also needs to be given to how major powers will engage
the Middle East in the coming decades. As China and India increase their
demand for oil, it is only logical these nations will pursue a more active role
in ensuring access to this vital resource.13 While currently lacking the strategic influence enjoyed by the United States, Chinese military investments are
clearly directed at increasing their ability to project power. On the one hand,
this increased interest in the region presents an opportunity for burden-sharing,
as both China and the United States will benefit from a stable Middle East;
however, if American forward presence is significantly reduced, a possibility
is created for foreign economic and military interests to fill the void. Should
America’s future relations with these emerging international powers deteriorate, the result may be the ceding of US influence in the region, actions that
could have lasting ramifications.

The Enduring Utility of Landpower
The potential for instability in the Middle East will only increase over
the next several decades. Unlike the ten years that witnessed the massive commitment of American forces in Iraq, future years will be less likely to require
a sustained ground campaign. United States vital interests as defined in this
article will not lend themselves to interventions for the purposes of promoting
regime change or the establishment of democratic institutions; the absence of
what some have termed “wars of choice” should not be mistaken for a reduction
in the role played by land forces in defense of America’s enduring interests
in the region. There are significant roles for Army and Marine forces in the
Middle East, roles that will remain relevant throughout time as part of our
national effort to promote stability and achieve strategic objectives.
First among these is the importance of demonstrating American commitment and resolve. The role of the military in the Middle East cannot be
understated. As national institutions, the armed forces of the region hold significant political influence.14 They serve myriad roles as forces for stability as
well as agents of repression, unconstrained by the constitutional limitations
that define the role of militaries in Western society. In its attempt to promote
stability and prevent conflict, one of the more effective ways America exerts
influence is by building partnerships with the armed forces of potential allies.
Not only do these relationships open channels of communication and reduce
opportunities for miscalculation, but they also tend to have a professionalizing
effect on the militaries involved.
The fact that the armed forces of the Middle East are predominantly
land-based should also not be discounted when developing military-to-military
relations. Statistics show that across the Middle East, ground forces constitute
approximately 87 percent of all military forces (see Figure 2).15
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Total Military

% Ground
Forces

% Air
Forces

% Naval
Forces

8,200

73%

18%

9%

Egypt

704,000

88%

7%

5%

Iran

868,000

94%

2%

4%

Iraq

275,200

97%

2%

1%

Israel

621,500

83%

14%

3%

Jordan

160,700

92%

7%

0%

Kuwait

39,500

89%

6%

5%

Lebanon

76,400

98%

1%

1%

Oman

34,000

74%

15%

12%

Palestinian Authority

49,000

100%

0%

0%

Qatar

11,800

72%

13%

15%

Saudi Arabia

214,500

84%

9%

6%

Syria

411,500

89%

10%

2%

Turkey

800,000

71%

16%

14%

United Arab Emirates

65,500

90%

7%

3%

26,500

98%

1%

1%

4,366,300

86%

9%

5%

Country
Bahrain

Yemen
Total

Source: 2011 INSS Military Forces Database.
Figure 2. Composition of Middle East Militaries.

The United States needs to retain sufficient ground forces to ensure a relevant,
productive relationship with these land-force components. A reduced forward
presence is certainly a sound policy based on the expected strategic environment;
however, America cannot allow this to result in loss of interaction between its
military and those of the region. Efforts to improve the effectiveness of regional
armed forces also serve as a potential buffer against the hegemonic ambitions
demonstrated by Iran. These military-to-military relationships frequently result
in partnerships that provide the United States with local intelligence networks
that directly impact America’s ability to counter terrorists resident in the region.
A component of this counterterrorism mission for Army forces is the
targeted disruption of terrorist organizations based throughout the Middle
East. Secure, persistent access throughout the region is not guaranteed once
American forces complete their withdrawal. Absent continued partnerships
and an operational footprint in key states, the complexity of future counterterrorism operations increases dramatically. Without the ability to maintain
a forward ground presence, precision strikes remain one of the few options
available to national policymakers, but the ability to detain terrorists and leverage any intelligence will be lost without the participation of ground forces.
Perhaps even more damaging, the moral legitimacy associated with remote
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drone and air strikes has come under ever-increasing criticism throughout the
international community.16 Reliance on cross-border remote strikes, whether
from drones or aircraft, will erode support for American goals and ultimately
undermine the accomplishment of national objectives.
Major interstate war will arguably be the least likely source of instability in the Middle East in the next few decades. Iran’s aspirations for regional
leadership, however, along with the demonstrated tendency for regional powers
that are suffering political duress to focus on external threats as a means of
distracting the populace from the unrest at home make war in the Middle East
a real possibility. Along with efforts to partner with regional militaries, the
United States needs to retain highly capable and readily deployable ground
forces capable of deterring and, if necessary, defeating regional aggressors.
American dominance of the air and sea is not likely to be challenged for the
foreseeable future. As a means of deterring aggression and possible combat
between regional militaries, however, relying solely on long-range precision
platforms greatly reduces the strategic and operational options available to our
national policymakers.
Increasing urbanization with the penchant for warring factions to blend
into the civilian population vastly increases the challenges associated with future
warfare in this region. There is little doubt American airpower will remain
capable of inflicting unacceptable damage and rapidly defeating any invading
force. These capabilities and recognized dominance do not necessarily translate
into victory against the wide range of military options that are much more likely
than armored warfare. Whether the task becomes the separation of belligerents,
enforcement of a zone of neutrality, or the defeat of insurgent forces, American
military options need to encompass the full range of responses beyond precision
strikes. Recent Israeli experiences against Hezbollah and Hamas demonstrated
that airpower alone is ineffective against the hybrid forms of warfare that are
increasingly commonplace in the Middle East.17
Reliance on local forces backed by American airpower, though often
advocated as a cost-effective option, also entails specific risks. As demonstrated
most recently by operations in Libya, the United States and its allies risk losing
the ability to shape the outcome of even a minor conflict without a sufficient
and persistent, ground presence. The importance of creating and maintaining
stability in the Middle East argues against the employment of American military capability unless accompanied by a capacity to set conditions and manage
a positive result.
Finally, the ability to rapidly deploy large numbers of ground forces
provides policymakers and strategists with a number of strategic options. As
a demonstration of political intent, there are few acts a president can take that
demonstrate American resolve more than boots on the ground. The commitment
of ground forces capable of operating across the spectrum of combat can in and
of itself prevent conflict from escalating without necessitating the destruction
of an adversary’s military or infrastructure. While some number of these forces
can and should be resident in the reserve component, the requirement to rapidly
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deploy capable ground forces demands a credible percentage be retained in the
active force.

Where Do We Go from Here?
By all indications, conditions in the Middle East over the next few decades appear bleak. Just as the global economic importance of the region reaches
its crest, demographic and political pressures combine to promote instability on
a scale not seen in recent history. When this instability is placed in the context
of the aspirations associated with a nuclear-armed Iran and the pernicious presence of international terrorist organizations, ensuring stability in the region will
require a concerted effort by all agencies of the United States and its allies.
Developing the appropriate military strategy for the Middle East begins
with an evaluation of our enduring national interests. Limiting American interests to those that are truly vital results in a relatively short list. The danger lies
in incorporating goals that either have proven unachievable or do not directly
impact America’s security, prosperity, or values. Even when developing a strategy that narrowly defines our vital interests, it is blatantly obvious there are
several critical missions that can only be achieved by capable ground forces.
With regional stability as the primary strategic objective, the importance of
preventive measures cannot be overstated. The United States has already made
a major investment in regional stability through its efforts in Iraq. While far
from perfect, we should not squander these gains but capitalize on them in the
pursuit of lasting stability.
Maintaining and expanding partnerships with regional militaries will
strengthen national bonds, increase communication, and minimize the opportunities for strategic miscalculation. At the same time, professionalizing our
allies’ militaries serves to deter regional actors who may be inclined to influence the local populace. As America’s network of forward bases disappears,
there is ever-increasing pressure to maintain relationships as a means of gaining
access and the intelligence required to counter terrorists operating throughout
the region. Finally, it is in America’s strategic interest to retain military ties
to the Middle East. Accepting a reduced forward presence need not equate to
the dissolution of relationships, particularly as other major powers will have
increasing incentives to fill the void left by America’s withdrawal. With ground
forces constituting the overwhelming majority of the military organizations
in the Middle East, it is only logical America’s Army remains resourced and
trained to accomplish US military objectives in this region.
The Army, as part of the joint force, will serve as a credible deterrent
to interstate conflicts in the region. America’s air and naval forces, by their
inherent dominance, make the reemergence of classic conventional warfare
extremely unlikely. Their utility against other forms of warfare, however,
whether an insurgency or a hybrid threat that operates among an urban population, will be greatly diminished unless accompanied by highly capable ground
forces. Because the regional threats detailed earlier in this article make low-level
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conflict increasingly likely, it remains in America’s interest to retain a force
capable of deterring, and, if necessary, defeating any military threat.
As we consider what military forces should be retained to defend US
interests in the Middle East, the answer that evolves is neither a pure counterinsurgency force nor one weighted toward stand-off precision fires. Instead,
the nation should retain a balanced force capable of operating across the full
spectrum of conflict. This in no way undermines the continued prudent investment in air or sea power. An honest assessment of the threats throughout the
Middle East and the capabilities required to counter them argues for a significant ground force capability. The global importance of the Middle East through
2030 demands a ground force capable of partnering with and training allies
while deterring and defeating any land-based threat.
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